In many organizations, the by-laws or rules prescribe that an election will take place by secret ballot (or simply “by ballot”, which implies a secret ballot). If this is the case, it is critical that certain procedures be followed or else the election will be drawn into question. This is because each individual member has a basic right with respect to a secret ballot vote, and if that right is violated then the election will be null and void. This right is, of course, the right to the secrecy of his or her vote.

The right to secrecy has a number of implications that are not immediately obvious. The first is that write-in candidates must be permitted, and counted the same as any the other candidates. Any rule that requires a certain number of nominators, or requires notice of intent to nominate, or notice of intent to run for election, etc., is incompatible with any superior rule that requires a secret ballot. The reason for this is that the nominators and/or candidates would thereby be forced to disclose their preferences as to who should be elected, and that is a violation of their right to secrecy of the ballot. It is interesting to note that this implication in turn implies that the lowest-ranked candidate may not be “dropped” from the ballot for successive rounds of balloting, which is also a common but incorrect practice.

The second implication is that the vote must actually be held by ballot, even if there is only one person nominated to the office. The common practice in some societies of declaring the single nominee to be elected by acclamation, without a ballot vote, is not correct, and can be successfully challenged by a point of order at any time during the term of office of the person so elected. The practice of authorizing the secretary to cast a single ballot on behalf of the assembly, and then counting that as a ballot vote, is similarly illegitimate. The reason that neither of these practices is acceptable is that they both take away the right of every member to secretly indicate his or her preferences for a write-in candidate.

The third implication is that the assembly may not, after the election is complete, adopt a motion to “make the election unanimous” when it was not actually unanimous, unless the vote to make it unanimous is also taken by secret ballot. The reason for this is that it would otherwise force any member who did not want to make the result unanimous speak up and disclose his or her voting preferences. This is not to say that the motion to make the vote unanimous will always fail, but rather that to have any legitimacy it must be held under the same conditions of secrecy as the original election vote.

The fourth implication is that the presiding officer, if a member, votes (or abstains) during the main balloting period just like every other member, and therefore does not cast a tie-breaking or tie-making vote after seeing the results, which under any other form of voting he or she would normally do. This is because the presiding officer, if a member, is entitled to the same right to secrecy as any other member, and is also entitled to the right to vote. Since the vote is secret, there is no conflict with his or her duty to maintain the appearance of impartiality.

It is important to note that there is one element of a secret ballot vote that is decidedly not secret, and that is the details of the result of the vote. In many organizations, it is common to keep secret how many ballots were cast, or how many votes were received by each candidate, but this practice is not correct. The tellers of the election are responsible for preparing a comprehensive report on these numbers, presenting it to the assembly, and giving a copy to the secretary so that it can be transcribed into the minutes. The presiding officer is then responsible for announcing who is elected, and whether or not additional balloting is required.

Overall, it is clear that secret ballot elections must be handled carefully to avoid a continuing breach of the rules. However, as long as one keeps in mind that every member has the absolute right to the secrecy of his or her vote, and preferences for who should win the election, it is fairly easy to determine how, and how not, to conduct such an election.